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Abstract
We examine optimal price ceilings when the regulator is uncertain about demand and
supply conditions and maximizes expected consumer surplus. We consider both a perfectly
competitive benchmark and imperfectly competitive settings where symmetric rms compete
in supply functions. Our analysis indicates that regulatory uncertainty does not eliminate
the scope for intervention with a price ceiling. Instead, su¢ cient uncertainty calls for softer
intervention, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level. We formalize the relationship
between competitive pressure and the optimal price ceiling and show that, if uncertainty is
great enough, the optimal price ceiling is increasing in the degree of competition, so that
greater competitive pressure justies less restrictive regulatory intervention. For the perfectly
competitive case, we also explore how the optimal price ceiling is related to the level of
rationing e¢ ciency, pinning down a cut-o¤ level of e¢ ciency below which a price ceiling
should not be used.
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1 Introduction
Although controversial, price ceilings have been used in a wide range of markets, including those
for rental accommodation, gas, electricity, telecommunications, and pay-day lending. One ratio-
nale for introducing a price ceiling is to correct market ine¢ ciency stemming from insu¢ cient
competition. Another is the protection of consumers, which may explain the use of rent controls
in markets that are nearly competitive. Insofar as price regulation is designed to correct inef-
ciencies from market failures, it would aim to maximize total welfare. Nonetheless, empirical
evidence on past intervention suggests that the realities of regulation are more complex, with
lobby groups inuencing regulatory intervention in their own interests.
Recent years have witnessed an increase in the focus of policy makers and regulators on
consumer welfare. This has coincided with an increased role of consumer groups in policy
debate. In the UK, following the 2002 Enterprise Act, approved bodies were designated super-
complainants at the O¢ ce of Fair Trading (now part of the Competition and Markets Au-
thority). This was explicitly to strengthen the voice of consumersand protect their interests.1
These changes call for a better understanding of a consumer-surplus standard in economic analy-
sis and a recent literature examines the impact of price ceilings in this context (e.g., Davis and
Kilian, 2011, Bulow and Klemperer, 2012).2
In this paper, we explore how underlying market conditions a¤ect the level of a price ceiling
that maximizes expected consumer surplus in a setting where the regulator is uncertain about
demand and supply conditions. Our framework allows for varying degrees of competition, so
it ts a gamut of market structures. We rst investigate the impact of regulatory uncertainty
on the optimal ceiling and then explore the relationship between competitive pressure and the
optimal level of intervention. Finally, we examine the e¤ect of arbitrary levels of rationing
ine¢ ciency on the optimal ceiling.
In our model the regulator is imperfectly informed about demand and supply and is aware
of this informational disadvantage.3 However, private agents have all relevant information,
so that uncertainty is entirely on the part of the regulator. This information structure also
covers the possibility that the price ceiling is a long-term regulatory decision, whereas short-run
market conditions may change.4 We focus on a frictionless homogeneous product market where
1These changes may be due to the deregulation of utility markets, increased market complexity (e.g., banking
and nancial services), and growing evidence on consumer bounded rationality. Traditionally, industry lobbying
(small supplier groups) has been more e¢ cacious. Consumers (a large but fragmented group) have been less
e¤ective; see Viscusi et al. (2005, Ch.10) and O¢ ce of Fair Trading 511 (2003). The consumer organization
Which? - which inuenced tari¤ regulation in the UK energy sector in 2014 - was one of the rst super-
complainants.
2This standard has been used in merger evaluations in Europe and the US. See Besanko and Spulber (1993)
and Neven and Röller (2005) for related analyses, and Motta (2004) for a discussion including caveats of this
standard.
3For example, a regulator may not have detailed knowledge of what innovations are in the pipeline or of the
demand for new products.
4 It has been widely employed in the theory of regulation (see Armstrong and Sappington, 2007) and was rst
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a binding price ceiling lowers the cost of purchase to the consumers, but results in a shortage.5
For tractability, we assume quadratic cost and benet functions, but we argue in section 3 that
the qualitative results have more general applicability.6
In a preliminary analysis of a perfectly competitive benchmark with e¢ cient rationing, we
show that with no uncertainty the price ceiling that maximizes consumer surplus always binds.
The reduction in price due to regulation increases the surplus of consumers who still purchase,
whilst the resulting drop in quantity supplied decreases it; the price e¤ect prevails and the net
impact on consumer surplus is positive. This result is robust to the introduction of relatively
low levels of demand or supply uncertainty. We then go on to introduce arbitrary levels of
uncertainty, and characterize the optimal price ceiling.7 We show that regulatory uncertainty
does not eliminate the scope for intervention with a price ceiling. Instead, su¢ cient uncertainty
calls for softer intervention, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level. At this level the
price ceiling may not bind ex post, and so may not benet consumers. However, this higher
ceiling o¤ers protection against potentially high free market price levels.
We then develop an imperfectly competitive framework, which can be interpreted as the
reduced form of a model where identical rms compete in linear supply functions. The analysis
draws on the fact that in this setting aggregate supply in the imperfectly competitive equilibrium
is a fraction of the perfectly competitive one. The reduced form model with an aggregate output
restriction relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark can also represent a monopoly and
so our results apply to this limiting case.
If there is no regulatory uncertainty the optimal price ceiling is the same for any degree
of competition. However, with su¢ cient regulatory uncertainty, we show that the appropriate
level of the ceiling depends on the degree of competition, as this determines the price in the
unregulated market. The more concentrated the market, the greater is the expected consumer
surplus loss if there is no regulation. This creates a stronger incentive to lower the price ceiling,
triggering a positive relationship between the optimal ceiling and the degree of competition.
Thus, with enough uncertainty, a higher price ceiling, i.e., less restrictive intervention, is justied
in an environment with greater competitive pressure.8
formalized by Weitzman (1974) and subsequently used in analyses of regulation starting with Baron and Myerson
(1982) and Lewis and Sappington (1988).
5With imperfect competition and search frictions, Fershtman and Fishman (1994) show that a price ceiling
reduces price dispersion and increases the average price. In a related model that allows for heterogeneity in
consumer information costs, Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) show that the policy sties incentives to
become informed about the prices and this lowers rmsincentive to undercut. See also Rauh (2004) for a model
with frictions on both the demand and supply side.
6Our analysis focuses on the role of uncertainty in a static framework. However, from a normative perspective,
the introduction of a price cap is likely to have dynamic consequences, most notably, by reducing rmsinvestment
incentives. See, for instance, Dobbs (2004) for related discussion.
7Our benchmark model focuses on regulatory uncertainty regarding demand. In an online appendix we show
that qualitatively similar results obtain in a model with supply uncertainty only. We also outline in this appendix
the corresponding model with two-sided (demand and supply) uncertainty and we explore its solution numerically.
8A di¤erent stream of literature examines price ceilings in homogeneous-product oligopoly markets when rms
face demand uncertainty. See, in particular, Earle, Schmedders, and Tatur (2007).
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We also extend the benchmark model to explore the impact of rationing ine¢ ciency on the
optimal price ceiling. We determine a cut-o¤ level of rationing e¢ ciency below which a price
ceiling should not be used, and we show that our previous ndings are qualitatively robust when
rationing e¢ ciency exceeds this level.9 At a binding price ceiling all consumers who buy the
product enjoy a higher surplus than in the absence of regulation. But with ine¢ cient rationing
some of these consumers displace others who value the product more. If rationing is su¢ ciently
ine¢ cient, the loss in consumer surplus from such ine¢ cient reallocations and lower supply fully
o¤sets the benets of the consumers (who buy) at the lower price.
By considering arbitrary levels of rationing ine¢ ciency and regulatory uncertainty, our nd-
ings complement those of Bulow and Klemperer (2012). They focus on random rationing in a
model with no uncertainty and general demand and supply. They show that if supply is locally
more elastic than demand a price ceiling always hurts consumers when demand is convex. Price
regulation and the welfare loss associated with ine¢ cient rationing in competitive markets have
also been explored by Glaeser and Luttmer (1997, 2003) and Davis and Kilian (2011).10 Our
analysis contributes to this emerging literature by exploring the role of uncertainty and its in-
terplay with rationing ine¢ ciency. By parameterizing the e¢ ciency of rationing, we propose a
exible framework that allows for a range of outcomes and extends previous work.
Section 2 formulates the model. Section 3 presents a preliminary analysis of the benchmark
model with little or no regulatory uncertainty, while section 4 introduces arbitrary levels of
uncertainty. Section 5 then analyzes the imperfect competition case. Section 6 explores the
implications of rationing ine¢ ciency. Section 7 presents conclusions. All proofs missing from
the text are relegated to appendices.
2 The Model
Consider a market in which the regulator may be uncertain about the demand and supply for
a homogeneous product. There is no uncertainty on the part of private agents. On this basis,
the regulator chooses a price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus. The regulatory
intervention is announced to all private agents (producers and consumers).
First we introduce a perfectly competitive benchmark model. Let consumersgross benet
(or utility) from the consumption of q units of the product be given byB(q; ) = (B+)q bq2=2
where b > 0; B +  > 0. From the regulators point of view  is a random variable with zero
mean (E() = 0) distributed according to a twice continuous and di¤erentiable c.d.f. F()
dened on a closed interval [nmin; nmax]. We assume that the hazard rate F 0()=(1   F()) is
9 In the online appendix our model with only supply uncertainty allows for rationing ine¢ ciency. The results
we obtain are consistent with those with demand uncertainty only.
10Glaeser and Luttmer develop a model to examine empirically the misallocation due to rent control and show
that under conservative assumptions, 20% of rented apartments in New York City were in the wrong hands. Davis
and Kilian (2011) analyze empirically the US residential market for natural gas and nd substantial allocative
costs over the 1950-2000 period.
4
strictly increasing. The inverse demand is
Pd(q; ) = @B(q; )=@q = B +    bq :
The supplierscost of producing q units is given by C(q; ) = (C + )q + cq2=2 where c > 0;
C+  > 0. From the regulators point of view  is a random variable with zero mean (E() = 0)
distributed according to a twice continuous and di¤erentiable c.d.f. G() dened on a closed
interval [tmin; tmax] :We assume that the hazard rate G0()=(1 G()) is strictly increasing. The
two shocks  and  are assumed to be independent. The inverse supply is
Ps(q; ) = @C(q; )=@q = C +  + cq :
Writing p for unit price, it follows that direct demand and supply are given, respectively, by
qd(p) =
B +    p
b
and qs(p) =
p  C   
c
: (1)
We assume that consumers can observe , and that producers can observe  as well as ,
while the regulator can observe neither shock. This captures the informational advantage that
producers may have over the regulator regarding demand.11
Denote by p the ex-post market-clearing price (where qd(p) = qs(p)) and by q the corre-
sponding output level: Then,
p =
c(B + ) + b(C + )
b+ c
and q =
B +    C   
b+ c
: (2)
We assume that B +  > C +  for any  and . This guarantees a well-dened equilibrium
output ex post. Note that ex ante (before the demand and supply shocks  and  are realized),
the regulator views p(; ) as a random variable with expected value
pe =
cB + bC
b+ c
: (3)
We explore regulatory intervention that takes the form of a price ceiling p, assuming that
resale of rationed goods is not possible. A price ceiling stipulates a maximal trade price and
only binds if the unregulated market price lies above the regulated level. If it lies at or below
the ceiling, the outcome coincides with the unregulated market equilibrium; that is, for a given
price ceiling p; if p  p, then q(p) = q (as given by (2)) and if p > p, then q(p) = qs(p) (as
given by (1)). The c.d.f. of p(; ) is determined by the c.d.f.s of  and ; that is, F() and
G(), respectively. Since both  and  are dened on closed intervals, so is the c.d.f. of p(; ).
We then examine price ceilings in a model of imperfect competition, maintaining our as-
sumptions regarding the demand side of the market and the quadratic cost presented above.
We assume that there are N identical suppliers and each rm is cost of producing qi units is
11 It may be that  is unknown when the regulator sets a price ceiling, but is revealed by the time the producers
make supply decisions; or it may be that producers can adjust their behavior as information about  is revealed
by the market.
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given by C(qi; ) = (C + )qi +Ncq2i =2.
12 We interpret our model as one where the rms com-
pete by choosing linear supply functions. Building on Klemperer and Meyer (1989), each rm
chooses a supply function Si(p C   ) = di(p C   ), where the slope di > 0.13 In the linear
supply function equilibrium, a rms supply is only a fraction of its supply in the competitive
benchmark (see Akgün, 2004 for related analysis). Thus, with imperfect competition, the rms
restrict their output compared to that in the perfectly competitive market. It then follows that
the aggregate quantity supplied in the symmetric supply function equilibrium at price p can be
written as
qs(p; ) = 
p  C   
c
,
where  < 1 captures the restriction in output below the competitive level. Note that  increases
in the degree of competition, captured by the number of rms, N . As the market becomes nearly
competitive (N !1),  converges to 1. We show these results in the appendix, building on the
supply function competition model. Alternatively, qs(p; ) can be regarded as an ad-hoc way of
capturing the restriction in aggregate supply in a market where the rms have market power.
Using qs(p; ), we can derive the equilibrium outcome in the unregulated imperfectly com-
petitive market. Denote by p the ex-post unregulated market price (where qd(p) = qs(p; ))
and by q the corresponding output level: Then,
p =
c(B + ) + b(C + )
b+ c
and q =
 (B +    C   )
b+ c
:
As in the competitive framework, the regulator views the unregulated market price p(; ) with
imperfect competition as a random variable.
In general, regulation that takes the form of a price ceiling may result in excess demand, in
which case the scarce output will be rationed. Although rationing may in principle be e¢ cient,
with the supply of output allocated to the consumers whose valuations of the good are highest,
in practice there may well be some degree of ine¢ ciency. A recent literature (see, for instance,
Davis and Kilian, 2011) has focused on the alternative of random rationing, whereby the available
supply is allocated randomly amongst those consumers whose valuations of the product are at
least as great as the sale price.
Intuitively, the scope for pro-consumer price regulation is limited by rationing ine¢ ciency.
To examine the impact of such ine¢ ciency, we adapt our competitive benchmark by introducing
a parameter  2 [0; 1] that captures the e¢ ciency of rationing. We write the regulators objective
function as a linear combination of the expected consumer surplus for e¢ cient rationing and for
12This individual cost function guarantees that when the total cost of producing q using N -plants in the industry
is minimised, total cost equal is C(q; ) = (C + )q + cq2=2, the same as in the perfectly competitive benchmark:
Then, the marginal cost curve coincides with P s(q).
13Klemperer and Meyer (1989) provide a thorough analysis of supply function competition. In particular, they
show that with unbounded demand uncertainty and a symmetric industry there is a unique equilibrium where
rms choose linear supply functions of the form we consider. This result holds regardless of the distribution of
uncertainty (even if it degenerates into a mass point), so long as the support is unbounded.
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extremely ine¢ cient rationing where the available supply is allocated to the consumers whose
valuations are the lowest among those who are willing to buy.14 In particular, rationing is
e¢ cient when  = 1; extremely ine¢ cient when  = 0, and random when  = 1=2.
3 A Preliminary Analysis
This section introduces some of our results in a textbook framework of perfect competition
and e¢ cient rationing (i.e., we assume that  = 1 and  = 1). We start with a situation where
demand and supply are deterministic, and show that consumer surplus can be increased from the
free-market benchmark by setting an appropriate binding price ceiling.15 We then discuss why
this result still holds when there is a limited amount of demand uncertainty. The next section
analyzes formally the demand-uncertainty case, allowing for arbitrary degrees of uncertainty.
Using the model introduced in section 2, let us initially assume that  =  = 0: The demand
and supply schedules become qd(p) = (B p)=b and qs(p) = (p C)=c, and the equilibrium price
in the unregulated market is p = (cB + bC)=(b + c). For any price ceiling p  p, the market
price is p and consumer surplus is given by
CS(qd(p)) = Bqd(p)  1
2
b

qd(p)
2   pqd(p) = b(B   C)2
2(b+ c)2
.
However, any price ceiling p < p is binding so that output is min[qd(p); qs(p)] = qs(p) =
(p  C)=c. With e¢ cient rationing, consumer surplus is
CS(qs(p)) = Bqs(p)  1
2
b (qs(p))2   pqs(p) = (p  C)[2c(B   p)  b(p  C)]
2c2
 CSLd . (4)
Using CS(qd(p)) and CSLd we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 With no uncertainty, the price ceiling p^ that maximizes consumer surplus under
perfect competition with e¢ cient rationing is given by
p^ =
cB + (b+ c)C
b+ 2c
< p . (5)
Setting a price ceiling slightly lower than p has a negative e¤ect on consumer surplus due
to a reduction in supply and the resulting exclusion of some low-valuation consumers from the
market. However, there is also a positive e¤ect as the lower price makes consumers who still
purchase enjoy a higher surplus. Panel A in Figure 1 illustrates the trade-o¤ between these
e¤ects at the optimal price ceiling p^. The consumer surplus lost due to the output reduction is
14Alternatively,  may be interpreted as the probability, for the regulator, that rationing will be e¢ cient. If this
probability is independent of the other stochastic variables in the model, we obtain the solution for uncertainty
of the rationing scheme. Another interpretation is that the available supply is split, with di¤erent portions being
rationed with di¤erent degrees of e¢ ciency.
15 In this setting, the free-market outcome is also the welfare-maximizing one. However, our analysis explores
pro-consumer price regulation, that is, intervention that aims to maximize consumer surplus rather than total
welfare.
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captured by the dotted triangle, while the gain in the surplus of consumers who still purchase is
captured by the dotted rectangle. As illustrated in the gure, the latter gain more than o¤sets
the loss due to undersupply. The optimal pro-consumer price ceiling balances this trade-o¤
and is strictly lower than the free-market equilibrium price p, and so it binds irrespective of
parameter values.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@@
p
q
A
p
p^
Pd(q)
Ps(q)
p p p p p p p pp p p p p p p pp p p p p p p pp p p p p p p pp p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p p p p pp p pp pp pp
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@@
p
q
B
E(p^())
p(nmin)
E(p
())
Pd(q; nmin)
Pd(q)
Pd(q; nmax)
Ps(q)
Figure 1: Optimal Pro-Consumer Price Ceiling with E¢ cient Rationing
Before introducing uncertainty, let us briey discuss how the analysis above would be af-
fected by nonlinearity of demand and supply. It can be seen that, for a given demand-supply
intersection and given slopes of demand and supply at this intersection, the same qualitative
conclusion holds if there is strict convexity or strict concavity of either curve. However, strict
convexity results in a higher optimal ceiling, while strict concavity results in a lower one than in
the linear case. Consider a strictly convex demand tangent to the straight line Pd(q) in Figure
1A at the intersection with Ps(q). The consumer surplus loss from the ceiling p^ is then larger
than in the gure, but the gain is the same. Still, there are binding ceilings for which the
net gain is positive (e.g., a ceiling marginally below p). A similar argument holds if supply is
strictly convex. Then the loss is the same, and the gain is smaller than in the linear case. These
conclusions are reversed for strict concavity.16
Let us now introduce a small amount of demand uncertainty into the model. We continue
to assume that supply is certain. Panel B in Figure 1 illustrates the highest and lowest demand
functions, Pd(q; nmax) and Pd(q; nmin), respectively. In this case, Pd(q) is the expected demand
and captures a situation where the realized value of  is equal to the expectation of , E() = 0.
16Lemma 1 states that for a given demand curve with any slope  b < 0, and supply curve with any slope c > 0,
the optimal price ceiling is below the market equilibrium price. It follows that if uncertainty is over slopes (but
the market equilibrium point known), expected consumer surplus is then maximized with a price ceiling below
the equilibrium price. We therefore conjecture that the general qualitative nature of our solutions would survive
if slopes, rather than intercepts, were unknown.
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For any realization of , consumer surplus is maximized at a price ceiling
p^() =
c(B + ) + (b+ c)C
b+ 2c
< p() .
This follows immediately from replacing B with B +  in Lemma 1. The expected optimal
ceiling is the same as the one presented in the proposition as E(p^()) = p^. This is because the
objective function only depends on the expectation of , E() = 0. This simple reasoning is
correct so long as p^ < p(nmin) - which is the case if there is only relatively little uncertainty.
Therefore, our result from the certainty benchmark carries over to a model with relatively little
uncertainty; the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus binds regardless of the
realization of demand. In contrast, if p^ > p(nmin), the analysis will be di¤erent: such a ceiling
may bind for some realizations of demand but not for others.
4 The Benchmark Model
We now fully investigate the impact of arbitrary levels of demand uncertainty assuming supply
is deterministic ( = 0). The analysis focuses on price regulation where the ceiling satises
p > C, so that supply is positive.
For a given price ceiling p, we dene n(p), the specic value of  for which the market clears,
i.e. p = p(). Using (2) with  = 0, we obtain
n(p) =
(b+ c)(p  pe)
c
, (6)
where pe, the expectation of p() is dened in (3).
In the parameter region where p < p(nmin) (i.e., for p so that n(p) < nmin) a price ceiling
binds and results in excess demand for all values of . In the region where p > p(nmax) (i.e.,
for p so that n(p) > nmax), a price ceiling does not bind and the free-market outcome prevails
for all values of . However, in the region where p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)] (i.e., for p so that
n(p) 2 [nmin; nmax]), the e¤ect of a price ceiling depends on the value of . In particular, for
low demand (when  2 [nmin; n(p))) the price ceiling does not bind, whereas for high demand
(when  2 [n(p); nmax]) it results in excess demand. Thus, we identify three regions of price
ceilings where the intervention has di¤ering implications. We will examine each of these three
regions as potential locations for the optimal value of p.
I In the low price region, regardless of ; the intervention binds.
I In the middle region, the ceiling may bind or not depending on the realization of .
I In the high price region, the intervention does not bind.
The low price region: In this case p < p(nmin) and, regardless of ; supply is a binding con-
straint, so output is min[qd(p); qs(p)] = qs(p) = (p  C)=c. Consumer surplus is CS(qs(p); ) =
(p   C)[2c(B +    p)   b(p   C)]=2c2, and expected consumer surplus is E(qs(p); ) = CSLd
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given in (4). The price ceiling that solves the f.o.c. of the optimization problem in this region
is p^ in (5):
Before proceeding, we introduce some notation.
Denition 1 Let n0 =  c(B   C)
b+ 2c
.
If nmin  n0, CSLd is increasing for all p < p(nmin) and the critical value p^ is weakly larger
than p(nmin), which is inconsistent with the region (C; p(nmin)): However, if nmin > n0, as
d2CSLd =dp
2 < 0, (5) is a well-dened local maximum within the region (C; p(nmin)). This
proves the following result.
Lemma 2 With demand uncertainty, if nmin > n0, then in the region where p < p(nmin) the
price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus under perfect competition is given by (5).
If nmin  n0, an optimal price ceiling cannot be strictly lower than p(nmin).
This result shows that with large enough demand uncertainty, in the sense that nmin  n0,
the optimal price ceiling must be at least as high as p(nmin) = min p(): Otherwise, Lemma
2 shows that there is a local maximum that is lower than p(nmin): After analyzing the other
possible levels of the price ceiling, we will explore the global optimality of this ceiling.
The high price region. Consider now a price ceiling in the region p > p(nmax): In this
case, regardless of the realization of ; the ceiling does not bind (so the outcome is the same as
with no intervention). For a given , consumer surplus is b(B +    C)2=2(b+ c)2: So expected
consumer surplus becomes
b[(B   C)2 + E(2)]
2(b+ c)2
 CSHd , (7)
and is the same as in the free-market equilibrium.
The middle price region. We explore price ceilings in the region [p(nmin); p(nmax)], so
that the corresponding n(p) 2 [nmin; nmax]: We make use of the following observation.
Remark 1 From the denitions of p() and n(p), it follows directly that prob(p  p) =
prob(  n(p)) = F(n(p)).
For any price ceiling p  p() (or, equivalently,   n(p)); the intervention does not bind,
the market-clearing price p() prevails and the quantity traded is qd(p; ) = qs(p). Since
qd(p; ) =
B +    p
b
=
B +    C
b+ c
 qd ;
consumer surplus in this case is given by
CS(qd) =
b(B +    C)2
2(b+ c)2
:
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Using Remark 1, it follows that expected consumer surplus conditional on p  p() is E(CS(qd) j
  n(p)) =
R n(p)
nmin
CS(qd)dF()

=F(n(p)). Substituting CS(qd), we obtain
b

(B   C)2F(n(p)) + 2(B   C)Ld (n(p)) + Ld (n(p))

2(b+ c)2F(n(p))  CS

d ;
where Ld (n
(p)) =
R n(p)
nmin
dF() and Ld (n(p)) =
R n(p)
nmin
2dF().
For p  p() (or, equivalently,   n(p)), however, the intervention leads to excess demand.
The realized consumer surplus from the qs(p) = (p C)=c units produced is the same as in the low
price region. Therefore, expected consumer surplus conditional on p  p() is E(CS(qs(p); ) j
  n(p)) =
R nmax
n(p)CS(q
s(p); )dF()

= [1 F(n(p))], which becomes
(p  C) [2c(B   p)  b(p  C)]
2c2
+
(p  C) Hd (n(p))
c(1 F(n(p)))  CS
S
d , (8)
where Hd (n
(p)) =
R nmax
n(p)dF():
Using CSd and CS
S
d , it follows that total expected consumer surplus for any given price
ceiling p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)] is
E(CS(p)) = F(n(p))CSd + (1 F(n(p))CSSd  CSd : (9)
Inspection of (4), (7) and (9) leads to the following result.
Lemma 3 With demand uncertainty, expected consumer surplus under perfect competition is
continuous and di¤erentiable for all values of p > C: Moreover, at any price ceiling p  p(nmax)
expected consumer surplus is independent of p.
For p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)]; the regulator sets the price ceiling to maximize CSd: An interior
optimal price ceiling in this region solves dCSd=dp = 0, where
dCSd
dp
=  (1 F(n(p)))(b+ 2c)(p  C)  c(B   C)
c2
 F(n(p))1
c
Ld (n
(p))
F(n(p) : (10)
The two terms here are related to the fact that either supply or demand may bind with price
ceiling p, and they are weighted by their respective probabilities. The fraction  [(b + 2c)(p  
C) c(B C)]=c2 is the value of dCSd=dp when there is no uncertainty and supply is the binding
constraint, as in our preliminary analysis. The second term in (10) shows the impact of demand
uncertainty. Ld (n
(p))=F(n(p)) (< 0) is the expected value of the demand shock , conditional
on demand binding, and a more negative value represents greater demand uncertainty. This
term has a positive impact on dCSd=dp.
We then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 With demand uncertainty, if nmin  n0, the unique price ceiling that maximizes
expected consumer surplus under perfect competition lies in the interval [p(nmin); p(nmax)). In
addition, this ceiling may be greater or smaller than the expected market-clearing price. Speci-
cally, CSd is maximized at p T pe as  (1 F(0))c(B   C)  (b+ c)Ld (0) T 0.
11
Proposition 1 holds if the regulator faces enough uncertainty. This favours setting a price
ceiling that is relatively high and, therefore, less likely to bind. If the price ceiling binds ex
post so that supply is a constraint, variation of the demand curve has no e¤ect on consumption.
However, if ex post the price ceiling does not bind, greater demand uncertainty generates a larger
expected consumer surplus. Consumer surplus for a given  equals (b=2) [(B +    C)=(b+ c)]2
and so demand uncertainty ( 6= 0) raises the expected value of this expression. Since demand
uncertainty has a positive e¤ect on expected consumer surplus if the ceiling does not bind, and
no e¤ect otherwise, it supports a high price ceiling that is less likely to bind. This works against
the incentive to set a relatively low price that we identied in our preliminary analysis and may
even o¤set it.
Example 1 Suppose  is uniformly distributed on [ n; n] so that Ld (0) =  n=4 and F(0) = 1=2:
The condition nmin  n0 in Proposition 1 becomes n  c(B C)=(b+2c). It follows that CSd is
maximized at p T pe as n T 2c(B C)=(b+c). Then, for n 2 [c(B C)=(b+2c); 2c(B C)=(b+c)),
the optimal price ceiling is lower than pe and for n > 2c(B   C)=(b+ c), the optimal ceiling is
higher than pe.
The result that with relatively little uncertainty CSd is maximized at p < pe is related to the
e¤ects discussed in section 3. There we saw that when demand and supply are certain, a price
reduction below the market equilibrium raises consumer surplus per unit bought. In contrast,
when demand is stochastic, it is not known ex ante whether realized supply will be a binding
constraint on consumption and, as a result, we show that for large enough uncertainty CSd is
maximized at p > pe.
However, when there is small enough uncertainty, the result from the certainty case still
holds so that CSd is maximized at p < pe. Moreover, with very little uncertainty, that is, if
nmin > n0, the analysis preceding Proposition 1 shows that an optimal price ceiling cannot lie
in the interval [p(nmin); p(nmax)]: Together with the ndings in Lemma 3, this establishes the
following result.
Proposition 2 With demand uncertainty, if nmin > n0, the unique price ceiling that globally
maximizes expected consumer surplus under perfect competition is given by (5) and always binds.
With relatively little uncertainty (nmin > n0), the optimal pro-consumer price ceiling is
strictly lower than p(nmin) and, implicitly, than the expected market-clearing price. This
result, along with Proposition 1, highlights the e¤ects of the degree of uncertainty on optimal
regulation. Proposition 2 generalizes the initial analysis illustrated in Figure 1B. In contrast,
if there is enough uncertainty (nmin  n0), the optimal price ceiling is higher than p(nmin) as
shown in Proposition 1.
In this section we have focused on the benchmark case of demand uncertainty with de-
terministic supply. In the online appendix we present the corresponding analysis with supply
uncertainty only (that is, with stochastic  but deterministic ) and show that the qualitative
results from the benchmark model carry over unchanged.
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Drawing on these results, we also explore two-sided uncertainty in the online appendix, that
is, we assume that  and  are both stochastic and are independently distributed. Again we
identify three candidate regions for the optimal price ceiling. However, in the middleregion
the objective function depends on whether p(nmin; tmax)  p(nmax; tmin) ? 0, and for each sign
of this inequality this region divides into three sub-regions. Although a complete analysis of the
model is then not tractable due to the complexity of the objective function, we show that the
results of our benchmark model are qualitatively robust. We investigate further the joint impact
of demand and supply uncertainty using numerical simulations, illustrating, for example, how
an increase in uncertainty can change the optimal price ceiling from below above the expected
market-clearing price.17
This section has focused on the role of regulatory uncertainty. However, the setting with
no uncertainty is a special case of our analysis where  has a degenerate distribution so that
nmin = nmax = 0, as we showed in section 3. Thus, the optimal price ceiling is p^ as given by (5)
with no uncertainty and remains at this level when a limited amount of uncertainty (in the sense
that nmin > n0) is introduced. But, with greater uncertainty (for nmin  n0) a price ceiling in
the middle region, p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)], is optimal. In this case, the no-uncertainty optimal
ceiling p^ belongs to the middle region. Evaluating (10) at p^, we obtain
dCSd(p^)
dp
=  1
c
Ld (n
(p^))  0 ;
where the weak inequality follows from Ld (n
(p^)  0, and holds with equality only for nmin = n0
(or, p(nmin) = p^). Therefore, if uncertainty is great enough (nmin  n0), the optimal price
ceiling which lies in the middle region is strictly higher than p^, the optimal ceiling with smaller
or no uncertainty.
5 Imperfect Competition
We now analyze the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus in the imperfectly
competitive framework presented in section 2. We assume that the regulator only faces un-
certainty regarding demand ( is stochastic and  = 0). We explore the robustness of our
ndings in the perfectly competitive benchmark to a more realistic setting where suppliers have
(some) market power, and analyze how changes in the degree of competition a¤ect the optimal
pro-consumer ceiling. In this model,  < 1 measures competitive pressure, with a larger value
corresponding to more intense competition. This analysis can be interpreted as the reduced
form of a model where rms compete in supply functions. However, at the end of the section,
we show that our analysis is informative also for monopoly markets.
17For both the one-sided supply uncertainty case and the two-sided uncertainty simulations we also allow for
rationing ine¢ ciency.
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First note that in a model with no uncertainty, the optimal pro-consumer price ceiling from
our preliminary analysis still obtains with imperfect competition because consumer surplus is
maximized at the same price level. However, as we show below, this is no longer true with large
uncertainty.
Consider a realization of demand . Then the equilibrium price in the imperfectly competitive
market is given by
p(; ) =
c(B + ) + bC
b+ c
> p()
where p() is the perfectly competitive price (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Imperfectly Competitive Price
A price ceiling p binds or not depending on its position relative to p(; ). If p  p(; ),
then the intervention does not bind and the imperfectly competitive market outcome prevails.
If p < p(; ), then the intervention binds and either demand or supply may be a constraint
depending on the position of p relative to the perfectly competitive price p(). More specically,
if p < p(), the quantity traded will be qs(p) and there is excess demand. If p() < p < p(),
the quantity traded will be qd(p) and there is excess supply.
Consider our supply function competition interpretation. If the market is unregulated, the
rms compete by choosing price-quantity schedules. However, in the presence of a binding price
ceiling, the rms can no longer adjust the price, so they can only choose optimally the output
levels.18 When the intervention binds, p becomes the (constant) marginal revenue. Therefore
the rms will supply the quantity at which p equals marginal cost P s(q) unless demand is a
binding constraint, in which case they supply the quantity demanded at p. So, the quantity
traded in the market at the regulated price is minfqd(p); qs(p)g, where qs(p) is the quantity
18 In this sense, in a market where, before intervention, rms compete in supply functions, the introduction of
a binding price ceiling leads to a change in competition as the rms become price-takers.
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at which marginal cost equals p.19 This is di¤erent from the perfectly competitive benchmark
where a binding ceiling could only result in excess demand.
As before, we examine the di¤erent price regions as potential locations for the optimal price
ceiling. We rst analyze the impact of a price ceiling in a situation where p(nmin; ) < p(nmax),
which is arguably more general.20 For a given , p(nmin; ) is the ex-post equilibrium price for
the lowest demand realization, while p(nmax) is the perfectly competitive price for the largest
demand realization.
(i) First consider a price ceiling p > p(nmax). For values of  at which the ceiling binds,
demand is a constraint, that is minfqd(p); qs(p)g = qd(p). As a result, a small decrease in p
will lead to an increase in consumer surplus. At values of  where the ceiling does not bind, a
decrease in the ceiling either has no e¤ect on consumer surplus or, if it has, it leads to greater
consumer surplus as the unregulated market price is above the competitive level for  < 1. This
shows that an optimal price ceiling cannot be strictly larger than p(nmax) as a slightly lower
one increases consumer surplus.
(ii) If p < p(nmin), the price ceiling binds regardless of the realized demand and our cor-
responding analysis in section 4 carries over unchanged. It follows that, with demand un-
certainty, if p(nmin; ) < p(nmax) and nmin >  c(B   C)=(b + 2c), in the region where
p < p(nmin); the price ceiling that maximizes expected consumer surplus is given by (5). But,
if nmin <  c(B C)=(b+2c), an optimal price ceiling cannot be strictly lower than p(nmin) as
expected consumer surplus is increasing in p in this case.
(iii) Let us now focus on p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)]. As p(nmin; ) 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)],
we can identify two sub-regions as potential locations for the optimal price ceiling, [p(nmin);
p(nmin; )] and (p(nmin; ); p(nmax)].
a) Consider rst p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmin; )]. The price ceiling binds regardless of the value
of . However, depending on , the intervention may lead to excess demand or excess supply.
More precisely, for a given price ceiling p, there exists a specic value of  = n(p) for which
p() = p. This is the same n(p) as the one presented in (6). If p  p() or, equivalently, if
  n(p), then there is excess supply, so that consumer surplus is determined by the quantity
demanded, qd(p). If p < p() or, equivalently, if  > n(p), then there is excess demand and
consumer surplus is determined by qs(p), the quantity at which marginal cost equals p. Denote
by CSL the expected consumer surplus in this case. Then,
dCSL
dp
=  1
b
(B  p)  b+ c
bc
Ld (n
(p))+
(b+ c) [c(B   C)  (b+ c) (p  C)]
bc2
(1 F(n(p))) , (11)
19Note that qs(p) is the same as the perfectly competitive supply. In contrast, qs(p; ) is the aggregate supply
in the unregulated market where the rms compete in supply functions and qs(p; ) = qs(p).
20Even if for some values of , p(nmin; )  p(nmax), there exists a cut-o¤ value 0, so that for  2 [0; 1),
p(nmin; ) < p
(nmax). This is because lim!1p(nmin; ) = p(nmin) < p(nmax). When  ! 1, the market
becomes almost perfectly competitive. The cut-o¤ value 0 is implicitly dened by p(nmax) = p(nmin; 0).
Towards the end of this section, we will return to the case where p(nmin; )  p(nmax).
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where Ld (n
(p)) is dened in section 4.
b) For p 2 (p(nmin; ); p(nmax)] the price ceiling may bind or not depending on the value
of . More precisely, there exists a cut-o¤ value of , let it be n(p; ), implicitly dened by
p(n; ) = p so that for  < n(p; ), the price ceiling does not bind and the quantity traded
is qd(p(; )). For   n(p; ), the intervention may lead to excess demand or excess supply
depending again on the value of . Specically, there exists another value of  = n(p) for which
p() = p. As in part a) above, this is the same as the one presented in (6), and n(p; ) < n(p).
If n(p; )    n(p), then there is excess supply so that consumer surplus is determined by
the quantity demanded, qd(p). If  > n(p), then there is excess demand and consumer surplus
is determined by qs(p), the quantity at which marginal cost equals p. Let CSH be the expected
consumer surplus in this case. Then,
dCSH
dp
=  1
b
(B   p)(F(n(p)) F(n(p; )))  b+ c
bc
Ld (n
(p)) +
1
b
Ld (n
(p; )) (12)
+
c(B   p)  (b+ c)(p  C)
c2
(1 F(n(p))) ;
where n(p; ) = [(b+ c)p  cB   bC]=c and Ld (n(p)) =
R n(p)
nmin
dF().
In the online appendix we show that for nmin >  c(B C)=(b+2c), the globally optimal price
ceiling is strictly lower than p(nmin) and given by (5), whereas for nmin   c(B   C)=(b+ 2c)
it lies in the interval [p(nmin); p(nmax)] and, depending on the parameter values, it is given by
either dCSH =dp = 0 or dCS
L
 =dp = 0.
21,22
Let us now briey turn to the case where p(nmin; )  p(nmax). As before, there are three
sub-regions of prices where the optimal ceiling could lie. The analyses for p > p(nmax) and p
< p(nmin) echo cases (i) and (ii) above and the corresponding results carry over unchanged.
For p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)], as p(nmin; ) > p(nmax), the price ceiling binds regardless of the
realization of . The intervention may lead to excess demand or excess supply depending on
the value of . Intuitively, the analysis in part iiia) above applies now to the entire range. It is
straightforward that the expected consumer surplus in this case is given by CSL .
We are now ready to state the following result.
Proposition 3 For su¢ ciently large demand uncertainty (nmin >  c(B   C)=(b + 2c)), the
optimal pro-consumer price ceiling with imperfect competition is increasing in the degree of
competition. For smaller uncertainty (nmin <  c(B   C)=(b + 2c)), it is independent of the
degree of competition.
With no uncertainty, the optimal ceiling is independent of . But, with su¢ cient uncertainty,
the optimal price ceiling is increasing in the degree of competition and, therefore, lower than the
21 In the special case where p(nmin; ) is the optimal ceiling, both dCSH =dp = 0 and dCS
L
 =dp = 0 hold.
22 In section 4, we found that, with perfect competition, expected consumer surplus is single peaked. This
single-peakedness result is robust with imperfect competition. We show this in the appendix by proving that
the slope of the expected consumer surplus with imperfect competition is weakly smaller than that with perfect
competition.
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one in the perfectly competitive market. A decrease in the optimal ceiling generates signicant
gains in consumer surplus under high demand realizations. If the optimal ceiling is lower than
p(nmin; ), so that it binds regardless of the realized demand, then it is independent of the
degree of competition and is weakly lower than in the competitive case. If the optimal ceiling
is higher than p(nmin; ), it may bind or not depending on the realization of demand and it is
smoothly increasing in the degree of competition.
Suppose that the price ceiling that is optimal under perfect competition were set in an
imperfectly competitive market. For demand realizations for which this ceiling does not bind
under perfect competition, the price that obtains under imperfect competition23 is higher than
the perfectly competitive market-clearing price. It is therefore above the consumer-surplus
maximizing price (see section 3), so that lowering the ceiling benets consumers. This argument
underlies the conclusion that the optimal ceiling is positively related to the extent of competition.
In this sense, our analysis shows that, with su¢ cient regulatory uncertainty, competitive pressure
weakens the scope for pro-consumer regulatory intervention.
In our imperfectly competitive market model, the aggregate output is a fraction  of the
competitive supply. This result builds on the supply function competition microfoundation and,
in the appendix, we show that   2c=(c+pc(2b+ c)) for N  2. However, the reduced form
model with an output restriction can also capture a monopoly market when  = c=(b + c).24
Therefore, the analysis in this section applies straightforwardly to a market with a monopoly
supplier.
6 Ine¢ cient Rationing
This section explores the implications of assuming ine¢ cient rationing in our benchmark model.
More precisely, we examine pro-consumer price ceilings in a perfectly competitive market with
uncertain demand and deterministic supply allowing for ine¢ cient rationing. As the analysis
builds on section 4, we focus on di¤erences stemming from rationing ine¢ ciency and we highlight
its interaction with the extent of demand uncertainty in the determination of the optimal price
ceiling.25 Provided rationing e¢ ciency  is great enough, the results from the benchmark case
still hold qualitatively, although the level of the optimal ceiling may depend on the value of .
However, we pin down a cut-o¤ rationing e¢ ciency below which a price ceiling should not be
set.
We use the three candidate regions for the optimal price ceiling specied in section 4. Since
a price ceiling in the high region, p > p(nmax), never binds, it can be seen immediately that
23This is either the imperfectly competitive equilibrium price or the ceiling, depending on the value of .
24This value of  can be pinned down by solving for the monopoly outcome but it also obtains in the supply
function microfoundation if we allow N ! 1.
25Full details of the derivations are relegated to the online appendix. The parallel case with deterministic
demand but uncertain supply is also analyzed there, allowing for ine¢ cient rationing.
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expected consumer surplus for a price ceiling in this region is una¤ected by rationing ine¢ ciency
and so, as in section 4, expected consumer surplus is given by (7). However, in the middle
region supply may be a binding constraint and in the low region it surely is, so for these regions
ine¢ ciency of rationing plays an important role.
When, for a given , supply binds, output qs(p) = (p   C)=c is rationed. If this supply
is allocated to the consumers whose valuations of the product are highest, consumer surplus
is given by CSLd in (4). Alternatively, however, suppose q
s(p) is purchased by the consumers
with the lowest valuations amongst those willing to pay at least p. Then the qs(p) = (p  C)=c
units available are purchased by consumers along the lowest part of the demand curve at and
above p, i.e., from qd(p)  qs(p) to qd(p). At qd(p)  qs(p) consumer surplus per unit is B +  
b
 
qd(p)  qs(p)  p, while at qd(p) it is zero. Taking the mean of B +    b  qd(p)  qs(p)  p
and zero, and multiplying by qs(p), consumer surplus is then b(p   C)2=2c2  CSLd0. We can
therefore write the consumer surplus for any  at which supply binds as
CSLd + (1  )CSLd0 =
(p  C)[2c(B   p) + (1  2)b(p  C)]
2c2
 CSLd () : (13)
In the low region (where p < p(nmin)) supply always binds and so CSLd () is the expected
consumer surplus. If  6= b=2(b + c); the price ceiling that solves the f.o.c. of the optimization
problem in this region is
p^() =
c(B + C)  (1  2)bC
2(b+ c)  b : (14)
Note that, for  = 1, p^() reduces to the value specied in (5). To be a well-dened local
maximum, p^() must lie in the interval (C; p(nmin)) and expected consumer surplus must be
concave at this price. However, if  < b=2(b + c); p^() < C and gives a CSLd ()-minimum.
CSLd () is increasing for all p 2 (C; p(nmin)), and so an optimal ceiling cannot lie in this
region.
Generalizing Denition 1, we introduce the following notation.
Denition 2 Let n0() =   [(b+ c)  b](B   C)
2(b+ c)  b .
We can now establish the conditions under which p^() is a local optimum and repeat the
derivation in section 4, but using (13) to allow for rationing ine¢ ciency. The following proposi-
tion generalizes Propositions 1 and 2 for arbitrary values of .
Proposition 4 Assume perfect competition and demand uncertainty. (a) For rationing e¢ -
ciency  > b=(b + c), there is a unique price ceiling that globally maximizes expected con-
sumer surplus. (i) If nmin > n0(), this optimal ceiling is given by (14) and always binds;
(ii) if nmin  n0(), it lies in the interval [p(nmin); p(nmax)) and this optimal p T pe as
 (1 F(0)) [(b+ c)  b] (B C) (b+c)Ld (0) T 0. (b) For rationing e¢ ciency   b=(b+c),
a price ceiling should not be set.
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This proposition highlights the combined e¤ects of the e¢ ciency of rationing and the degree
of uncertainty on the optimal price ceiling. The analysis pins down a cut-o¤ level of rationing
e¢ ciency  = b=(b+ c) above which the same qualitative conclusions apply as in the benchmark
case. Note, that the requirement that  > b=(b+c) is consistent with a wide range of ine¢ ciency.
If, for example, b < c, demand being less steep than supply, it is consistent with random rationing
( = 1=2). Provided that  > b=(b+ c), if uncertainty is relatively small (nmin > n0()) a price
ceiling in the low region, that is sure to bind, is optimal. A situation like this is illustrated
in Figure 1B. Alternatively, if uncertainty is greater (nmin  n0()), the optimal ceiling is in
the middle region and may or may not bind. The critical level of uncertainty, as represented
by n0(), is decreasing in . Thus, the greater is rationing e¢ ciency, the greater will be the
maximum amount of uncertainty for which the optimal ceiling will lie in the low region, and
bind for sure.
The condition for p T pe generalizes that in Proposition 1. When rationing e¢ ciency 
is smaller (but  > b=(b + c)), the level of demand uncertainty required for p to exceed pe is
greater.
When instead   b=(b+ c) a price ceiling should not be set, and this result holds regardless
of the amount of demand uncertainty. If rationing e¢ ciency is low enough, price regulation has
a large allocative cost which eliminates the scope for pro-consumer intervention. If b > c; this
non-intervention result holds even for random rationing; but, if b < c, intervention can improve
expected consumer surplus even with worse than random rationing.
Generalizing our result with e¢ cient rationing, if uncertainty is great enough (nmin  n0),
the optimal price ceiling lies in the middle region and is strictly higher than p^(), which is the
optimal ceiling with smaller or no uncertainty. Moreover, Proposition 4 allows us to characterize
fully the relationship between the e¢ ciency of rationing  and the optimal price ceiling.
Corollary 1 With perfect competition and demand uncertainty, for   b=(b+ c), the optimal
pro-consumer price ceiling is strictly decreasing in the e¢ ciency of rationing .
Thus, whenever it is optimal to set a price ceiling that may bind, there is a negative rela-
tionship between the optimal level and the e¢ ciency of rationing.
7 Conclusions
This paper explores the impact of underlying market conditions on optimal price regulation in
a setting where the regulators objective is to maximize expected consumer surplus, while being
imperfectly informed about demand and/or supply in the market.
We rst consider a perfectly competitive benchmark to show that regulatory uncertainty does
not eliminate the rationale for intervention with a price ceiling. Instead, su¢ cient uncertainty
calls for softer intervention, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level. Then, we
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develop an imperfectly competitive setting where symmetric rms compete in supply functions
and which accommodates arbitrary degrees of competitive pressure. We show that, if there is
su¢ cient uncertainty, the optimal price ceiling is increasing in the degree of competition.
Thus, when the regulator maximizes expected consumer surplus, competitive pressure justi-
es less restrictive regulatory intervention if uncertainty is large enough. This result is broadly
consistent, for example, with Oftels decision in 2002 to increase the price ceiling imposed on
British Telecom once new suppliers entered the telecommunications market.
We also analyze rationing ine¢ ciency, which plays a role if the ceiling binds and causes
undersupply. We identify a cut-o¤ level of rationing ine¢ ciency above a price ceiling should not
be used. However, if rationing is e¢ cient enough, the optimal ceiling depends on the degree of
regulatory uncertainty and is decreasing in the e¢ ciency of rationing, and our qualitative results
from the benchmark model carry over unchanged.
In the main text we have focused on demand uncertainty, but our results are qualitatively
robust in settings with supply uncertainty only, or where the regulator faces both demand and
supply uncertainty, as we formally show in the online appendix. Furthermore, some of the
basic intuition behind our results carries over to more general formulations of the cost and
benet functions, or of the regulatory uncertainty. Likewise, although our analysis explores the
maximization of consumer surplus, the main insights would be relevant in settings where the
regulatory objective is a weighted sum of consumer surplus and prot.
This study aims to shed light on how market characteristics impact on a price ceiling which
maximizes expected consumer surplus. Our work formalizes the economic intuition in a static
framework. A fuller analysis would need to investigate the dynamic e¤ects, of both the instru-
ment and the consumer-surplus standard, and to assess the relative performance of di¤erent
regulatory interventions in this context.
8 Appendix
8.1 A Preliminary Analysis
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) At a price ceiling p  p, dCS(qd(p))=dp = 0. (ii) When p < p,
di¤erentiating CSLd w.r.t. p, the f.o.c. gives the value in the proposition. The s.o.c. is always
satised. It is easy to check that the optimal ceiling is well dened, i.e., lies in the interval
(C; p).
8.2 The Benchmark Model
Proof of Lemma 3. It is straightforward to see from the denitions of CSLd , CS
H
d , and CSd
in (4), (7) and (9), respectively, that expected consumer surplus is piece-wise continuous and
di¤erentiable. Therefore this proof focuses on the continuity and di¤erentiability of the expected
consumer surplus at p(nmin) and p(nmax).
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Continuity at p(nmin) = [c(B+nmin)+bC]=(b+c): limp%p(nmin)CS
L
d (p) = CS
S
d (p
(nmin)) where
CSSd is dened in (8) and the equality follows from the fact that F(nmin)) = Hd (nmin) = 0. Since
Ld (nmin) = 
L
d (nmin) = 0, this shows that limp%p(nmin)CS
L
d (p) = CSd(nmin) so that expected
consumer surplus is continuous at p(nmin).
Continuity at p(nmax): Given that F(nmax) = 1, Ld (nmax) = 0 and Ld (nmax) = E(2), it
follows that CSd(nmax) = CSd(nmax) = limp&p(nmax)CS
H
d (p) = CS
H
d . So, expected consumer
surplus is continuous at p(nmax).
Di¤erentiability at p(nmin): In the low region,
limp%p(nmin) @CS
L
d =@p = [c(B   C)  (p(nmin)  C)(b+ 2c)] = c2. In the middle region, as
Ld (nmin) = F(nmin) = 0, @CSd(p(nmin))=@p = limp%p(nmin) @CSLd =@p. So, expected consumer
surplus is di¤erentiable at p(nmin).
Di¤erentiability at p(nmax): In the middle region, using @CSd=@p given in (10), together with
Ld (nmax) = 0 and F(nmax) = 1, it follows that @CSd(p(nmax))=@p = 0. As (7) is independent
of p, limp&p(nmax) @CS
H
d =@p = 0. So, expected consumer surplus is di¤erentiable at p
(nmax).
The second part of the Lemma follows from the fact that expected consumer surplus is continuous
at p(nmax) and (7) is independent of p.
Proof of Proposition 1. The second derivative with respect to p is
d2CSd
dp2
=
1
c2
[ (b+ 2c)(1 F(n(p)) + (b+ c)(p  C)F 0(n(p)] :
It is easy to see that, as Ld (nmax) = E() = 0 and F(nmax) = 1; p(nmax) satises the f.o.c.
of the optimization problem in this region: The objective function is convex at this point, and
so p(nmax) is a local minimum. Hence, CSd is decreasing in p as it approaches p(nmax) from
below. In addition, by Lemma 3, all p > p(nmax) result in the same levels of expected consumer
surplus as p = p(nmax):
Using (6) and (10), we can see that CSd is increasing at p(nmin) i¤ nmin  n0. Also, by Lemma
2, if nmin  n0; there is no candidate optimal price ceiling strictly below p(nmin). Therefore,
if nmin  n0; the global optimal price ceiling must belong to [p(nmin); p(nmax)) and is unique,
and
sign
d2CSd
dp2
= sign
 F 0(n(p))
1 F(n(p))  
b+ 2c
c2(b+ c)
1
(p  C)

;
where the hazard rate F 0(n(p))=(1 F(n(p))) is, by assumption, strictly increasing on [p(nmin);
p(nmax)]. As 1=(p   C) is strictly decreasing in p; it is straightforward to see that CSd has a
unique inexion point, pdI . Recall also that at p
(nmax); d2CSd=dp2 > 0 so that the function
is convex for all p 2 (pdI ; p(nmax)): However, if p < pdI , 1=(p   C) will take a higher value and
the hazard rate a lower one, so that d2CSd=dp2 < 0 for all p 2 (p(nmin); pdI). It follows that,
when nmin  n0 there is a unique globally-optimal price ceiling in [p(nmin); p(nmax)): Finally,
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we evaluate dCSd=dp at p = pe as given in (3):
dCSd(p

e)
dp
=  (1 F(0))(B   C)
(b+ c)
  1
c
Ld (0) :
The second term is non-positive, while the rst is non-negative as Ld (0) < 0.
8.3 Imperfect Competition
Supply Function Competition Foundation
Suppose the market demand is given by
D(p) =
B +    p
b
and that aggregate competitive supply in this market is
S(p) =
p  C   
c
:
Consider now an imperfectly competitive market. There are N identical rms in the market
with a quadratic cost C(qi) = (C + )qi + Ncq2i =2, where qi is the output of rm i. This cost
function guarantees that when the total cost of producing q using N -plants in the industry are
minimized, total cost equal is C(q) = (C + )q + cq2=2 as in the competitive benchmark model:
The rms compete in supply functions and each submits a schedule
Si(p  C   ) = di(p  C   ) = diep = Si(ep):
In the absence of regulation, each rm i is a monopolist against its residual demand given
by qi and maximizes
qip  qi(C + ) Ncq2i =2 = qiep Ncq2i =2:
Firm is residual demand is given by
qi =
B +    p
b
  j 6=idj(p  C   ) =
B +    C      ep
b
  epj 6=idj :
The f.o.c. of the maximization problem w.r.t. ep requires that
dqi
dep ep+ qi  Ncqidqidep = 0,
( 1
b
  j 6=idi)ep+ [1 Nc( 1
b
  j 6=idi)](B +    C      ep
b
  epj 6=idi) = 0:
This denes the optimal price. It follows that the residual demand at this optimal price is given
by
1
b +j 6=idi
1 Nc( 1b   j 6=idi)
ep:
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In equilibrium, rm i should choose its supply so that Si(ep) = diep is equal to this residual
demand at the optimal price. It then follows that
di =
1
b +j 6=idi
Nc( 1Nc +
1
b +j 6=idi)
<
1
Nc
:
Using the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium di = d for all is, the optimal slope d solves
d =
1
Nc
1
b + (N   1)d
1
Nc +
1
b + (N   1)d
<
1
Nc
:
In equilibrium each rm supplies Si(p) = di(p C   ) = d(p C   ) and aggregate supply
in the imperfectly competitive market is iSi(p) = Nd(p C   ) < p C c = S(p) which is the
supply in the corresponding perfectly competitive market. The inequality follows from
Nd =
1
c
1
b + (N   1)d
1
Nc +
1
b + (N   1)d
<
1
c
:
Therefore the supply in the imperfectly competitive market can be written as S(p) where  is
the abatement factor(see Akgün, 2004) and is given by
 = Ncd < 1:
It is easy to see that  2 [2c=[c+pc2 + 2bc]; 1) whenever N  2 and d=dN > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that nmin >  c(B   C)=(b + 2c), then the globally
optimal price ceiling is given by (5) and independent of .
Suppose instead that nmin <  c(B   C)=(b+ 2c).
Let p(nmin; ) < p(nmax). If the globally optimal ceiling lies in [p(nmin); p(nmin; )), it
solves dCSL =dp = 0 (see (11)). Evaluating (11) at the price ceiling that solves dCSd=dp = 0,
i.e., the optimal ceiling under perfect competition (see (10)), we obtain  [(B   p)F(n(p))+
Ld (n
(p))]=b =  [(B   p)+ Ld (n(p))=F(n(p))]=b < 0. The inequality follows from the fact
that Ld (n
(p))=F(n(p)) = E( j  < n(p)) 2 [nmin; nmax]. If the globally optimal ceiling lies in
[p(nmin; ); p
(nmax)), it solves dCSH =dp = 0 (see (12)). Whenever CS
H
 has an interior max-
imum in the interval (p(nmin; ); p(nmax)], the optimal ceiling is increasing in . This follows
from the local concavity of CSH at the optimal ceiling and from the fact that d(CS

H)
2=dpd
= b(p   C)2F 0(n(p; ))=c2 > 0: If the optimal price ceiling with imperfect competition lies
in this sub-region, it is strictly lower than the optimal ceiling with perfect competition. Let
p(nmin; )  p(nmax). Then, the globally optimal ceiling lies in [p(nmin); p(nmax)) and it
solves dCSL =dp = 0: The above comparison with the optimal ceiling under perfect competition
applies and the result follows.
8.4 Ine¢ cient Rationing
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (a). We rst establish the conditions under which p^() is a
local optimum. With  > b=2(b+ c), if nmin  n0(), CSLd () is increasing for all p < p(nmin)
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and the critical value p^() is weakly larger than p(nmin), which is inconsistent with the region
(C; p(nmin)): Similarly, if  2 (b=2(b+c); b=(b+c)) then, since nmin < 0, obviously nmin < n0(),
and so the critical value exceeds p(nmin). However, if nmin > n0() and  > b=(b + c), as
d2CSLd ()=dp
2 < 0, (14) is a well-dened local maximum within the region (C; p(nmin)). This
generalizes Lemma 2.
In the middle region p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)]. Following the derivation in section 4, but using
(13) to allow for rationing ine¢ ciency, we obtain
dCSd
dp
=  (1 F(n(p)))

[2(b+ c)  b] (p  C)  c(B   C)
c2

 F(n(p))


c
Ld (n
(p))
F(n(p)

.
Repeating the derivation in the proof of Proposition 1, part (a) of the Proposition 4 follows.
Part (b). When   b=(b+c), dCSd(p((nmax)))=dp = 0 and d2CSd(p((nmax)))=dp2 < 0, so that
p((nmax)) is a local maximum on p 2 [p(nmin); p(nmax)]. Also, from (13), dCSd(p)=dp > 0 for
all p < p(nmin). Finally, if a price ceiling is in the range p > p(nmax) it surely does not bind,
and so the value of  is not relevant. Therefore Lemma 3 still applies when   b=(b+ c), and it
follows that a price ceiling p(nmax) is outcome-equivalent to any ceiling p > p(nmax). Hence,
p((nmax)) is a well-dened maximum in the region [p(nmin); p(nmax)], and any price ceiling
higher than p(nmax) yields the same outcome, whereas CSd is lower for p < p(nmax).
Proof of Corollary 1. From Proposition 1, if nmin  n0 and  > b=(b + c), the optimal
price ceiling solves the f.o.c. dCSd=dp = 0 and the objective function is locally concave at that
price (see Proof of Proposition 1). It follows that sign(dp=d) = sign(dCS2d=dpd). Using this,
we obtain
d2CSd
dpd
= (1 F(n(p))) 2(b+ c)(p  C) + c(B   C)
c2
  
L
d (n
(p))
c
:
But the f.o.c. implies that
 1
c
Ld (n
(p)) =  (1 F(n(p))) [b  2(b+ c)] (p  C) + c(B   C)
c2
:
Therefore dCS2d=dpd =  (1 F(n(p))) bc2 (p  C) < 0 which implies that dp=d < 0:
From Proposition 4, if nmin > n0 and  > b=(b + c), the optimal price ceiling is given by p^()
and it is straightforward to see that dp^()=d =  bc(B   C)=[2(b + c)   b]2 < 0: Also, if
  b=(b+ c), the optimal ceiling is independent of .
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